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Malingering presents a large problem for society in terms of the allocation of resources to 
those who are truly in need. Memory deficits are commonly malingered after head injury. 
There has been great effort to develop measures that can reliably identify people who are 
feigning this type of impairment. In the field of memory, a robust line of research has 
shown that eye-movement measures are sensitive to relational memory and 
characteristics of these eye-movement effects have led researchers to suggest that they 
might represent an obligatory response to the retrieval of a relational memory. The 
current study investigates the possible utility of these eye movements in detecting when a 
person is attempting to conceal their memory to feign memory impairment. This study 
employed an instructional manipulation in which one group was asked to perform an 
upcoming memory task as though they were feigning memory impairment. This 
simulator group and a control group then completed a relational memory task while their 
eye movements were monitored. While simulators were able to conceal their memory 
with their explicit responses, early viewing patterns revealed their knowledge for the 
pairs they had studied earlier. This result provides additional support to the idea that eye-
movement measures may represent an obligatory measure of relational memory, as well 
as preliminary evidence that eye-movement based measures could be used to differentiate 
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Malingering, or the feigning or exaggerating of symptoms, is an act that may be done 
to achieve some kind of gain.  This gain could be financial, for example by increasing the 
chances of successful litigation.  It could also be an attempt to gain resources, with 
people acquiring special accommodations or resources because of their feigned deficits.  
Either way, malingering presents a problem for society, as those who truly do not need 
these services or financial settlements receive them unfairly.  One common symptom that 
is often feigned, and is the focus of the current study, is memory dysfunction following a 
head injury.  Memory problems following mild traumatic brain injuries do tend to be 
fairly common, occurring in approximately half of the patients who experience this type 
of injury (Fox et al., 1995; Garden & Sullivan, 2010).  However, research has also shown 
that the rate of malingering memory problems is also fairly high.  In reviews of legal 
cases and assessments of clinical samples, base rates of malingering have ranged from 
about 10% to 60% (Binder & Willis, 1991; Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Schmand et al., 
1998; Mittenberg et al., 2002; Slick et al., 2004).  Therefore, to make sure that resources 
are properly deployed to those who truly need them, it is critical that we identify 
measures that might be sensitive to memory, even when individuals are able to 
successfully conceal their memory on traditional recognition tests.  Past work has 
indicated that eye movements can be used to index memory indirectly, and that eye-
movement-based memory effects are evident across a variety of different paradigms 
(Hannula et al., 2010).   Here we combine eye movement methods with an instructional 
manipulation encouraging simulated malingering of amnesia to determine whether or not 
this type of measure could be useful in identifying people who are intentionally aiming to 
hide their memory.  
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Eye tracking is a tool that has been used to assess a variety of cognitive processes 
including language, attention, and most importantly for the current investigation, 
memory.  The way a person views any visual scene is not random and therefore provides 
us with information both about the characteristics of the scene and of the cognitive 
processes engaged by the observer.  Eye movements are in part guided by the perceptual 
characteristics of different parts of the scene, in that people tend to look at objects in a 
scene rather than empty spaces (Buswell, 1935).  In addition, characteristics of these 
objects such as size, hue, and luminance affect a person’s gaze pattern (Mackworth & 
Morandi, 1967).  This tendency is likely because the perceptually salient items within a 
scene may be more likely to provide useful information.  Examining participants’ 
viewing of visual stimuli over a period of time also showed that initially people tend to 
make shorter fixations to these perceptually salient, information-rich areas, whereas later 
in the trial, longer fixations are spent on the less informative regions of the scene, such as 
those that are not filled with objects (Antes, 1974).  Based on this early research, it 
appears that a person’s eye movements are in part guided by the characteristics of the 
scene, such that the most perceptually salient regions are likely to be examined the most 
quickly. 
Semantic Memory and Eye Movement Behavior 
Importantly for the current investigation, research has shown that in addition to 
perceptual characteristics of the scene, memory can also have an impact on eye 
movements. The earliest studies into the effect of memory on eye movements examined 
how a person’s prior knowledge, or their semantic memory, can influence the way they 
allocate their attention and view a scene in order to gather information. In one early 
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study, participants were presented with a scene titled “An Unexpected Visitor”, which 
depicts a room with various people and items and a man entering through the doorway 
(Yarbus, 1967).  Under free viewing conditions, this study showed the effects of the 
perceptual characteristics of the scene on viewing patterns.  For example, participants 
tended to look at the people in the room as well as the objects, and spent less time on the 
empty spaces of the floor and walls.  However, this experiment also involved several 
conditions in which participants were directed to answer specific questions by looking at 
the picture (e.g. “estimate how long the unexpected visitor has been away from the 
family”).  With each of these questions, participants exhibited different patterns of 
viewing, spending different amounts of time on the various aspects of the scene.  These 
differences in the pattern of eye movements elicited by these various questions were 
interpreted as an effect of semantic memory on eye movements.  It was suggested that 
participants had some general world knowledge about what regions of the picture might 
contain information necessary for answering the question, and this knowledge guided 
their gaze to these information-rich areas.  
A number of other investigations have also shown the effect that semantic memory 
can have on eye movements and attention (Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Henderson et 
al., 1999; Brockmole and Henderson, 2008; Hollingworth, 2009).  Two will be discussed 
in detail here.  First, an early study showed that semantic knowledge about the contexts in 
which certain objects are generally found had an impact on how a person would view a 
scene (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978). In this study, participants were presented with 
pictures of scenes that contained contextually consistent objects (e.g. a tractor in a 
barnyard) or contextually inconsistent objects (e.g. an octopus in a barnyard).  As 
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compared to contextually consistent objects, participants tended to fixate earlier in 
viewing, spend more time viewing, and direct a greater number of fixations toward 
contextually inconsistent objects.  This result suggests that semantic knowledge about 
objects that would typically be encountered in particular scene contexts impacts visual 
exploration of scenes.  In another experiment investigating the effect of semantic memory 
on eye movements, the goal was for a participant to locate and determine the orientation 
of a target object in a scene as quickly as possible (e.g. identify whether a pair of 
sneakers in a gym scene are at a specific orientation) (Hollingworth, 2009).  In each trial, 
participants saw a target probe, which showed the target object at a specific orientation.  
Following this probe, participants saw a scene that contained the target object and were 
asked to indicate whether or not it was in the same orientation that had been seen during 
the target probe.  The manipulation in this experiment was that for some trials, 
participants saw a preview of the scene they would later explore, while for other trials 
they did not receive this preview.  It was found that when participants were given a brief 
preview of the scene (10s), even when it did not contain the target object, they fixated on 
the target object more quickly.  Based on this time difference, it was concluded that 
having a preview of the scene that was going to be presented allowed participants to use 
their semantic knowledge of where specific objects generally appear within that context 
to guide their visual search.  These studies, and others like them (Henderson et al., 1999; 
Brockmole and Henderson, 2008), show that it is not only perceptual characteristics of 
the presented stimuli that influence eye movement behavior, but that the contents of a 




Episodic Memory and Eye Movement Behavior 
The previous studies have shown that semantic memory can impact how a person 
views a visual stimulus.  General world knowledge can aid viewers in searching areas of 
the image that might be useful to accomplish a certain task and lead them to spend more 
time viewing things that do not conform to their knowledge of the world.  While these 
studies suggest that eye movements are affected by semantic memory, for this type of 
measure to be useful in identifying people who may be malingering amnesia on typical 
recognition memory tests, it is more important that eye movements also be influenced by 
episodic memory.  While semantic memory is memory for general world knowledge, 
episodic memory is memory for past experiences or events (Tulving, 1972).  
Several investigations have indicated that eye movement measures can be used to 
distinguish between novel and previously seen visual stimuli. These studies have 
investigated how previous exposure to a stimulus affects the way a person will visually 
examine it when subsequently presented with it.  Some of these studies used materials 
that were familiar to the participants before they entered the experimental context (e.g. 
famous faces, familiar buildings) and investigated how people viewed these familiar 
items as compared to novel stimuli (Althoff et al., 1999; Althoff & Cohen, 1999).  These 
studies have shown that participants make fewer fixations and sample fewer regions of 
pre-experimentally familiar items as compared to unfamiliar items.  Althoff et al. (1999) 
also exposed their participants to the pre-experimentally unfamiliar stimuli several times 
in order to examine how gaze patterns changed as the participants became increasingly 
familiar with these images.  They found a repetition effect in that participants’ visual 
sampling of the stimuli decreased with repeated exposure to the materials, an effect that 
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was present regardless of task demands (i.e. even when participants were asked to do a 
non-memory task, such as an emotional labeling task).  These findings suggest that eye 
movements represent a sensitive indirect method to index episodic memory and that eye 
movement measures may be useful in revealing memory for a stimulus even when a 
person attempts to conceal this memory in their explicit responses, such as in 
malingering. 
Relational Memory and Eye Movement Behavior 
More recent research on the topic of the effect of episodic memory on eye movements 
has focused on relational memory, and has shown that eye movements can reveal 
memory for spatial and temporal relations, as well as memory for arbitrary pairings of 
stimuli (Ryan et al., 2000; Ryan & Villate, 2009; Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009).  Of the studies that use arbitrary pairings, many use a similar scene-
face paradigm, which will also be used in the current study due to the robust line of 
research that has been completed thus far (e.g. Hannula et al., 2007; Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009; Williams et al., 2010).  In this paradigm participants are first instructed 
to learn a series of scene-face pairs.  Subsequently, these participants are shown three 
previously studied faces superimposed on a previously studied scene. There are several 
variations of this testing phase, but in general, participants are asked to identify the face 
that had been previously paired with the presented scene via button press.  In these 
studies, eye movement measures have revealed that people show disproportionate 
viewing towards this matching face over the other two faces in the display, despite the 
fact that all three faces were presented equally often during the encoding phase.  This 
pattern of viewing reflects memory for learned scene-face relationships, and is an 
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example of an eye-movement-based relational memory effect (Hannula et al., 2007; see 
Hannula et al., 2010 for review).  
In addition to demonstrating that previous experience with stimuli can have an effect 
on eye movements, several interesting characteristics of these eye movements have also 
been explored.  As a part of their analyses, the previously discussed studies usually 
involve a time course analysis, which examines the pattern of viewing directed to the 
stimuli over the duration that they are presented.  With these analyses, it has been shown 
that disproportionate viewing towards the matching face occurs extremely quickly after 
stimulus onset (i.e. between 500 and 750ms). Response-locked analyses of these viewing 
patterns also revealed that the eye movement effects precede explicit behavioral 
responses by about 1000ms.  In addition to the rapid appearance of this eye-movement-
based relational memory effect, these eye movements also appear to be unaffected by 
task instructions.  The effect was observed not only when participants were actively 
attempting to identify the face that had previously been paired with the scene, but also 
when disproportionate viewing towards the target face was counterproductive.  For 
example, in Hannula et al. (2007), when participants were told to study the scene and all 
three faces for a future recognition test, they still showed preferential viewing towards the 
face that had been paired with the scene during the encoding phase.  As they were 
instructed that they would be required to remember all three faces, preferentially viewing 
the face for which they already had a relational memory representation is 
counterproductive to the goal at hand.   
Other paradigms have been used to demonstrate that eye-movement based relational 
memory effects are present in the absence of awareness.  One example of this comes 
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from a study in which participants studied scenes and were subsequently presented with 
these scenes after some sort of manipulation had been performed (i.e. an object was 
deleted, added, or moved from one location to another).   When such manipulations were 
made to these studied scenes, participants’ gaze was drawn to locations that had been 
manipulated (e.g. for an object moving manipulation, the region that the object has been 
moved to and the region it was moved from).  This pattern of eye movements was 
observed even when participants were unable to explicitly report the change (Ryan et al., 
2000).   Despite the sensitivity of this method, individuals with documented memory 
impairments do not show evidence of any relational memory-based viewing patterns.  
Work with such patients will be described in the next section.  Overall, these three pieces 
of evidence (i.e. rapid expression, resistance to differences in task instructions, and 
occurrence in the absence of conscious awareness) suggest that these memory-based 
viewing effects may occur involuntarily.  In the current investigation, these qualities 
make eye movement measures a good candidate for identifying people feigning amnesia.  
The aim is to evaluate whether or not these eye-movement based memory effects will 
reveal participants’ memory for previously studied arbitrary pairs, even when they are 
able to successfully hide this memory through their explicit behavioral response.  
Eye Movement Behavior in Memory-Impaired Populations 
In order to claim that eye movements are a valid measure for identifying people 
malingering amnesia, it is vital to know about the eye movement patterns during similar 
tests for individuals with documented memory impairments.  Because eye movements are 
able to provide a sensitive, indirect measure of memory in patient populations who may 
have difficulty explicitly reporting their memories (see Hannula et al., 2010 for review), 
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several investigations have examined eye movement behavior in memory-impaired 
populations.  Such studies have found that eye-movement-based memory effects differ 
from those of controls when examining healthy older adults (Ryan et al., 2007), adults 
with MCI (Crutcher et al., 2009), patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Daffner et al., 1999), 
patients with neurological damage to the medial temporal lobe (Hannula et al., 2007; Lee 
& Rudebeck, 2010; Ryan et al., 2000), and patients with schizophrenia (Hannula et al., 
2010; Williams et al., 2010).  Two of these studies that used the scene-face paradigm 
described previously and used in the current study will be described below (Hannula et 
al., 2007; Williams et al., 2010). 
Using the scene-face paradigm described previously, Hannula et al. (2007) tested 
both participants with hippocampal amnesia and non-impaired controls.  They found that 
not only did the hippocampal amnesic patients show significantly worse, chance-level 
performance for identifying the matching face, they also did not exhibit the typical 
disproportionate viewing towards this matching face that the control participants showed.  
In fact, even when the hippocampal amnesic patients correctly identified the target face, 
they still did not show disproportionate viewing towards this face like controls do.  This 
result confirms that even when the patients managed to respond correctly, their choices 
were not guided by memory.  Another special population that has been tested with this 
paradigm is schizophrenics who were suspected to have disproportionate relational 
memory deficits (Williams et al., 2010).  This study confirmed that these patients do 
seem to have a relational memory impairment with decreased ability to select the face 
that had been paired with the scene.  In addition, although these participants did exhibit 
the eye-movement-based relational memory effects, they were reduced in magnitude and 
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occurred significantly later after stimulus onset relative to control data (approximately 4-
6 seconds after stimulus onset as compared to 500-750ms in control participants).  These 
two studies suggest that when using the scene-face paradigm, robust differences can be 
found in the eye movement patterns between participants who have documented memory 
impairments and non-impaired populations.  In contrast, in the current investigation we 
expect that participants who are feigning a memory impairment will show a similar 
pattern of early viewing to participants who are completing the task optimally.  
Therefore, if our hypotheses are confirmed, eye movement measures could be useful in 
identifying people who are malingering amnesia. In sum, their overt memory reporting 
may look like that of people who actually have memory deficits, but they would show 
typical eye-movement-based memory effects that would reveal their deception. 
Detection of Memory Malingering 
The research discussed thus far has shown that eye movements can reflect the 
contents of a person’s memory, that these eye movements may be obligatory responses to 
the presentation of previously experienced stimuli, and that they are absent or different in 
timing and magnitude in populations with actual memory impairments.  One question 
that has not been as fully investigated, and is the focus of the current investigation, 
concerns the eye movement patterns of people who have intact relational memory 
abilities, but who are intentionally hiding their memory.  As described previously, 
malingering occurs at significant rates and can make it more difficult for financial and 
societal resources to be effectively deployed to the people who truly need them (Binder & 
Willis, 1991; Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Schmand et al., 1998; Mittenberg et al., 2002; 
Slick et al., 2004). The act of hiding the true contents of one’s memory can serve several 
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purposes and so the detection of such deception has both empirical and practical import.  
One reason for hiding the contents of a person’s memory is to feign amnesia for a 
financial or accommodation-seeking gain.  For example, one might pretend to have 
extensive memory impairment after injury in order to gain advantage in legal 
proceedings.  Another person might feign amnesia in order to gain disability services.  
One large review of over 30,000 legal cases reported that probable malingering was 
present in 30% of disability cases, 29% of personal injury cases, 19% of criminal 
proceedings, and 8% of cases about medical matters (Mittenberg et al., 2002).   
Due to these high rates of feigned symptoms, detection of malingering has long been 
of interest in the neuropsychological and legal fields.  Documentation of cognitive 
deficits in these types of cases is usually completed with a full neuropsychological 
evaluation, during which it is strongly recommended that at least one assessment of 
malingering or effort is completed (Bush et al., 2005).  Early research noted that normal, 
healthy individuals were relatively easily able to produce neuropsychological test results 
that indicated some sort of cognitive deficit (Faust et al., 1998; Heaton et al., 1978).  
From this observation, the development of Performance Validity Tests (PVTs) began.  
Early PVTs such as the Digit Memory Test and the Portland Digit Recognition Test were 
assessments of memory using a two-alternative forced choice format.  The benefit of this 
format is that chance performance is known to be 50%, so if a person scores reliably 
below this value, it is good evidence that they have some knowledge of the correct 
answer and are feigning a memory deficit.  However, many studies have shown that when 
healthy participants are asked to feign a memory impairment on these types of tests, only 
about a third of them score reliably below chance, indicating that the specificity of these 
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assessments is quite poor (e.g. Guilmette et al., 1993; Martin et al., 1993; Greiffenstein et 
al., 1994).  This high percentage of false negatives has led researchers to state that these 
below-chance criterion PVTs should not be used, especially in isolation, for the detection 
of malingering (Vickery et al., 2001).  
With the problems of the below-chance criterion for PVTs, new ways of interpreting 
the results from these tests were devised.  It was proposed that instead of comparing an 
individual’s performance to chance levels, it should instead be compared to the 
performance of an appropriate clinical normative sample, for example participants with 
memory impairments who have no incentive to exaggerate their deficits (Guilmette et al., 
1993).  The logic is that if a person performs significantly below the performance of 
people with known deficits, they are likely not giving full effort on the assessment.  
However, unlike performing below chance levels, which indicates that a person has 
knowledge and is actively avoiding sharing it, there are other factors that could lead a 
person with true memory dysfunction to perform below the levels of a clinically impaired 
population, such as poor cooperation or an unusually severe deficit (Vickery et al., 2001).  
Therefore, if a person’s performance is reliably below that of the comparison group, but 
not reliably below chance, claiming that they are malingering is not an entirely valid 
conclusion.  Furthermore, in a meta-analysis investigating the relative utility of a number 
of PVTs, using these normative-based cutoffs, the sensitivity of these assessments ranged 
from 22% to 83%, with an average around 55% (Vickery et al., 2001).  Therefore, these 
assessments are still resulting in a large proportion of false negatives. 
Some researchers have aimed to develop PVTs on which truly clinically impaired 
populations perform similarly to controls, so that it is easier to detect below-normative 
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performance of malingerers.  Two of these measures, the Test of Memory Malingering 
(TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) and Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, Allen, & Aster, 
1996) both appear like many other memory-based neuropsychological measures and rely 
on the fact that malingerers will continue with their low-effort performance on these 
measures.  The TOMM capitalizes on the fact that simple visual memory is relatively 
robust in memory-impaired populations.  During this assessment a series of 50 line 
drawings are shown to the participant, which are later tested in a two-alternative forced 
choice format.  Testing conducted with this assessment tool has shown that it is 
insensitive to neurological memory impairment (Tombaugh, 1996).  Validation studies 
have shown that the TOMM has high sensitivity when used to detect people who are 
giving sub-optimal effort (Rees et al., 1998). The WMT is a measure of verbal memory 
that has several different tests including short and long-delay recall and recognition 
measures.  Several of these measures are insensitive to all but the most severe memory 
impairments and an interpretation of the pattern of performance has been shown to be 
valid for detecting biased responding (Green et al., 2003; Iverson et al., 1999). 
While the TOMM and WMT have shown greater sensitivity and specificity than 
many other PVTs, their use is still not without problems.  One of these problems is that 
these measures rely on the malingerer not realizing that these effort measures are any 
different from the other neuropsychological measures, and therefore continuing their low-
effort performance. With the easy distribution of information due to the Internet, 
individuals being tested, as well as their lawyers, have more information than ever about 
these PVTs, including the name, the appearance, and the measurement and interpretation 
(Bauer & McCaffrey, 2006). This knowledge of these testing procedures makes it 
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possible that individuals could identify which tests are used to measure effort and simply 
perform with greater effort selectively on these tests, thus evading detection.  In fact, 
warning individuals as to the presence of PVTs in an assessment battery has been shown 
to lead to more sophisticated and harder to detect malingering (see Youngjohn et al., 
1999, for review).  Therefore, the issue of coaching and test security is a potential threat 
to the utility of these types of PVTs.    
Indirect Measures of Memory Deception 
Any malingering measure that relies on explicit behavioral responding will be subject 
to the above coaching concern.  Therefore, the current study aimed to investigate the 
indirect eye-movement measure that could reveal true memory contents for a person who 
is hiding it with their explicit responses.  The use of indirect measures to detect concealed 
memories is something that has been used in legal investigations where a person hides 
knowledge of a crime in order to protect themselves or someone else.  In order to detect 
this type of deception, many researchers turn to something known as the Guilty 
Knowledge Test.  In this test, a question is asked with several multiple choice answers 
and the belief is that a person with the knowledge of the crime will react differently to the 
correct response, whereas an innocent person will react the same to all of the choices.  
For example, if asked what kind of gun was used in a crime and given three choices, an 
innocent person with no knowledge of the crime will have similar responses to all three 
choices, while a guilty person will react differently to the correct answer (MacLaren, 
2001).  During this test, the idea is that a guilty person will explicitly deny knowledge of 
the correct answer, but indirect, physiological measures will be able to reveal their 
possession of the information.  For example, the Guilty Knowledge Test is most 
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commonly administered in combination with skin conductance response (SCR) 
recordings.  SCR increases as a person’s emotional arousal increases (MacLaren, 2001) 
and it is assumed that on the Guilty Knowledge Test the correct responses usually lead to 
a greater emotional response than the innocuous incorrect responses for a person with 
knowledge of the crime.  On the other hand, for the innocent participant, all choices are 
equally innocuous and so they should not show a difference in SCR for the critical 
response.   
In addition to SCR, other indirect measures have also been used in the detection of 
guilty knowledge.  Using EEG, the N400 component has been shown to discriminate 
relatively well between participants with and without crime knowledge when they 
listened to crime-related sentences with accurate or false completions (Boaz et al., 1991).   
In addition, a P300-based Guilty Knowledge Test has been developed, capitalizing on the 
P300’s response to rare or meaningful stimuli (Farwell & Donchin, 1991).  In this type of 
test, participants are assigned an arbitrary task where they are asked to respond to some 
kind of target item and not to all other items.  These “other” items consist of crime-
relevant items that would only be known by someone who has guilty knowledge of the 
crime, and irrelevant items.  For the innocent participant, the P300 component would be 
elicited for the target items, due to the meaning assigned to them by the experimenter, but 
not for any of the other items.  For the guilty participant, the P300 would again be elicited 
for the target items, but also for the crime-relevant items.  In this way, the ERPs for the 
crime-relevant items can distinguish between participants with crime knowledge and 
those without.  Finally, pupil diameter has also been demonstrated as a useful indirect 
measure for detecting deception (Dionisio et al., 2001; Lubow & Fein, 1996; Bradley & 
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Janisse, 1981).  These studies showed that pupil diameters tend to be larger when 
someone is concealing information as compared to when they are accurately reporting.   
All of these studies indicate that there is the possibility that indirect measures could 
be of use in detecting someone who is aiming to conceal their memory.  However, there 
are reasons that these three measures might not be ideal for use in neuropsychological 
assessments of malingering.  SCR, as described previously, relies on emotional arousal to 
particular stimuli, which is why it is useful in Guilty Knowledge Tests where crime-
relevant information is thought to be more arousing than other information.  In a standard 
recognition test involving studying information and later being tested, lying on the test 
items would not necessarily create this autonomic arousal.  In addition, some issues with 
SCR as a valid measure of guilty knowledge exist, because individuals can be taught to 
evade detection through the imagination of emotional events (Ben-Shakar & Dolev, 
1996).  The EEG measures capitalize on detection of false statements and rare, 
meaningful stimuli, which again while useful in the Guilty Knowledge Test, would not be 
applicable in the standard neuropsychological PVTs, which typically use standardized 
materials that will not often be particularly meaningful.  Finally, pupil diameter measures 
could be useful in a standard PVT, but, like SCR, pupil diameter is affected by general 
autonomic arousal as well as cognitive processing load (Bradley et al., 2008; Granholm et 
al., 1996).  Therefore, it could be possible to evade detection by mentally increasing 
emotional arousal or cognitive processing during the task.  These studies of indirect 
measures of deception do give support for the idea that indirect measures could be useful 
in detecting malingering during neuropsychological assessment.  However, because of 
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the limitations of the measures listed above, the current investigation aims to put forward 
fixation-based eye movements as a potential measure for detecting malingering. 
There has only been one study investigating eye movements as a measure for 
detecting concealed knowledge (Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  This study referred to the 
previous research indicating the potential for eye movements to provide an indirect index 
of memory combined with a Guilty Knowledge Test paradigm.  In this study, participants 
first learned a series of faces, which were either classified as “friends” or “foes”.  Once 
the faces were learned to criterion, test trials consisting of lineups of six faces were 
presented and participants’ eye movements were recorded throughout this phase. 
Participants were instructed that some of the displays would contain one of the studied 
faces, and that if the lineup contained a “foe” they should select that face to turn them in.  
If the lineup contained a “friend”, they should protect them by selecting one of the other 
faces.  If the lineup did not contain a studied face, they were asked to select any of the six 
faces.  Results showed that participants spent a greater duration of the trial fixated on the 
faces of foes, which were both known and selected, as compared to the faces of friends, 
which were known but not selected.  The authors classified this as a response intention 
effect.  However, more importantly, this study revealed that participants fixated longer on 
the faces of friends that were known and non-selected than they fixated on non-selected 
faces in trials without a friend or foe, which were neither known nor selected. This 
greater viewing indicated memory for the friend despite the hiding of this recognition 
through the explicit response.  Therefore, this study provides evidence for the current 
investigation’s suggestion that eye movements might be a valuable indirect measure of 
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examining the contents of a person’s memory when they are trying to conceal this 
knowledge.    
However, the current investigation extends the findings of Schwedes and Wentura 
(2012) by applying the use of eye movements to a more standard recognition memory test 
such as those used in neuropsychological assessment.  This will allow for a stronger 
conclusion that fixation-based eye movement measures could be used to detect not only 
trial-by-trial concealment of memory as with the other indirect, physiological measures, 
but also more generalized malingering of memory deficits.  In the previous study, 
participants were told when to tell the truth, on foe trials, and when to conceal their 
memory, on friend trials.  The current study uses a more lifelike malingering scenario 
where participants are asked to feign a memory deficit but not given specific instructions 
as to how to accomplish this task.  The previous study also only used a fixation duration 
analysis and an analysis of the location of the first three fixations, which does not allow 
for a complete analysis of the pattern of viewing that occurs across a trial as a person 
attempts to conceal their memory.  Therefore, the current investigation will employ a 
time-course analysis to investigate how viewing changes across time when participants 
are answering items to the best of their ability as compared to when they are feigning 
memory problems.  Lastly, unlike the paradigm in the Schwedes and Wentura (2012) 
study, the current study utilizes a paradigm with documentation for the performance of 
truly memory-impaired populations, such as those with hippocampal amnesia and 
schizophrenia (Hannula et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2010).  These patients show viewing 
patterns that are different from those of healthy controls.  This means that if it were 
demonstrated that simulated malingerers show eye movement patterns similar to healthy 
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controls, there would be greater evidence that eye movements could be useful in 
distinguishing between those who have true memory impairments and those who are 
feigning such impairments.  
 
Current Experiment 
Thus far, two separate lines of research have been discussed. First, eye movements 
have been shown to be rapid and perhaps involuntary reactions to the presentation of 
previously studied stimuli, an effect that has been found to be robust in the context of 
relational memory.  Second, the act of concealing the contents of one’s memory, and the 
detection of this deception has been the focus of a large field of research.  The current 
experiment will combine these lines of research to evaluate whether eye movements 
might index relational memory even when participants successfully hide memory via 
behavioral responses.  In the current study, participants completed the scene-face 
paradigm used in Hannula et al. (2007) and other studies (Hannula & Ranganath, 2009; 
Hannula et al., 2010), which has consistently shown eye-movement-based relational 
memory effects.  Novel to this study is that some participants were asked to complete this 
task as though they were feigning a memory deficit. With this instructional manipulation 
we had several hypotheses. First, we believed that these simulator participants would be 
able to successfully feign amnesia and show poorer recognition accuracy through their 
explicit behavioral responses.  We predicted that control participants’ accuracy would be 
significantly greater than chance, while simulators would be closer to chance level 
performance. We did expect group differences in response times on these test trials, with 
simulator participants responding more slowly than controls due to the increased 
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cognitive processing that needs to occur to successfully feign memory impairment. 
Importantly, it is also predicted that eye-tracking measures will reveal the true contents of 
memory of these simulator participants.  While differences in viewing patterns across the 
entire trial are expected between simulators and controls, equivalent early 
disproportionate viewing is expected to be directed to the matching face for both control 
and simulator participants, even on trials for which the simulators’ explicit responses are 
incorrect.  Put simply, even when participants fail to explicitly acknowledge the presence 
of the matching face, their pattern of early eye movements will reveal their memory for 
the scene-face pair. Finally, on a post-test where simulators are asked to change their 
strategy and now perform to the best of their ability, we expected to still see poorer 
performance from the simulator subjects, even though both groups were now instructed 
to try their best on this test.  This prediction stems from previous research showing that 
suppression of a memory during one retrieval period can impair the ability to 
subsequently retrieve that memory (Anderson & Green, 2001). We posited that the 
processes necessary to conceal knowledge of the scene-face pairs and successfully feign 
memory impairment might lead to this type of suppression-induced forgetting.   
With these hypotheses, this study had two main goals.  First, if these hypotheses are 
confirmed, this study will have provided further evidence that eye-movement-based 
relational memory effects are expressed obligatorily, and perhaps automatically, as they 
occur even when a person is attempting to conceal their memory.  Second, this study 
could provide preliminary evidence that eye tracking could prove to be a useful tool in 
identifying people malingering a memory deficit as compared to those who truly suffer 
from memory impairment.  As discussed previously, it has been demonstrated that 
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hippocampal amnesic and schizophrenic patients show patterns of viewing that are very 
different from healthy controls (either in presence or timing and magnitude of 
disproportionate viewing).  Since our early eye-movement hypothesis predicts that 
simulators will show similar patterns of viewing as healthy controls, this would mean that 
it would be different from the pattern seen in those who truly have a memory deficit, 
which could become a useful way to distinguish between these two groups.  This study 
went beyond previous studies because it allowed for the examination of eye movement 
patterns in participants who are feigning a memory impairment but who are not given any 
specific instructions on how to hide their memory from the examiner (e.g. unlike the 
Schwedes & Wentura study above that directed participants to purposefully not select 
friends whenever they saw them).  Therefore, our procedure is much more similar to how 
a person might react if they were attempting to feign general memory impairment.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-six undergraduate students from the UWM community (18 assigned 
randomly to the simulator and control groups, respectively) completed this experiment 
and were compensated with course credit.  Additional participants were tested and 
compensated for their time, but were not included in reported analyses because eye 
tracking data could not be reliably obtained (n=10), they failed to comply with 
instructions or reported low effort and motivation on the post-test questionnaire (n=6), or 
there was experimenter error (n=3). Informed consent was obtained from each participant 






Materials & Apparatus 
 Materials for this investigation included 162 images of scenes (81 indoor and 81 
outdoor) and 162 faces (81 male and 81 female).  Scenes were sized to 800x600 pixels, 
while faces were sized to 280x280 pixels and were superimposed on a 300x300 pixel 
grey background.  Eye movement data were recorded using an Applied Science 
Laboratories R6 Remote Eye Tracker that records participants’ eye position every 
16.7ms. 
Procedure & Design 
Participants were randomly assigned either to a control group or to a simulator group, 
and after obtaining informed consent, one experimenter read the participant the 
instructions that corresponded to their group membership.  Participants in the control 
group were told that they were about to be given a memory test and that they should 
complete it to the best of their ability.  Participants in the simulator group were read a 
scenario in which they were instructed to pretend malinger a memory deficit in order to 
win a lawsuit following a car accident.  The scenario used for this experiment was a 
modified version of the one used in Suhr & Boyer (1999) and can be found, in full, in 
Appendix A.  No specific strategies about how exactly to malinger were provided (e.g., 
participants were not told to attempt to answer a certain percentage of the items 
incorrectly or to avoid looking at task relevant materials).  Following these instructions, a 
second experimenter, who was blind to the group assignment, entered the room to 
administer the experimental protocol, which was identical for both groups of participants. 
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 The memory task included 3 interleaved study-test block sequences. For each of 
these sequences, 3 study blocks were followed by a corresponding test block. The 
materials used in each study-test block sequence were not repeated in subsequent blocks.  
In each study block, 42 scene-face pairs were presented and participants were instructed 
to try to remember which face was paired with which scene.  Each trial consisted of a 
2000ms presentation of the scene alone, followed by 4000ms of the same scene presented 
with the face superimposed on top of it (see Figure 1).  As indicated previously, 3 study 
blocks were followed by a single test block.  This means that the same scene-face pairs 
were presented 3 times in a different random order across blocks.  Following the third 
study block, participants completed 12 trials of the test phase.  Here, each trial consisted 
Figure	  1.	  Example	  study	  and	  test	  trials.	  A)	  A	  series	  of	  study	  trials	  for	  two	  different	  subjects.	  B)	  An	  example	  of	  a	  test	  trial	  that	  would	  be	  seen	  by	  both	  Subject	  1	  (as	  a	  target-­‐present	  trial)	  and	  Subject	  2	  (as	  a	  target-­‐absent	  trial).	  	  The	  yellow	  box	  highlights	  the	  critical	  face	  for	  both	  groups	  and	  is	  for	  illustration	  purposes	  only.	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of a studied scene cue for 2000ms, followed by the scene with a three-face display 
superimposed on top of the scene for 6000ms (see Figure 1).  All three of the faces had 
been previously studied, but in half of the test trials the face that had been previously 
studied with the current scene was present (i.e. target-present displays) while in the other 
half it was not present (i.e. target-absent displays).  On every test trial, participants were 
instructed to view the display and to indicate on a button box whether the associated face 
was present or absent. Control participants were instructed to complete this task to the 
best of their ability, while simulators were instructed to feign memory impairment.    
After all 3 study-test block sequences were administered a post-test was completed.  
During this post-test, all of the participants were instructed to perform as accurately as 
possible (i.e. the malingering instructions were removed). The experimenter told 
participants that this final test would allow us to determine how well they had encoded 
the materials during the study phase.  The 36 trials that comprised the post-test were the 
same as the 36 test trials seen throughout the experiment.  In each post-test trial, the 
participant was cued for 2000ms by a previously studied scene and then was asked to 
respond to a 3-face display that was superimposed on top of the scene for 6000ms.  They 
were instructed to select the matching face if it was present using a button box, or to 
select a face at random if it was not.  Then they were asked to indicate verbally whether 
or not the matching face was present in the display.   
Eye movements were recorded throughout all study, test, and post-test block trials.  
Participants were seated approximately 25in from the computer screen on which the 
materials were displayed.  Calibration was achieved prior to each block using a 9-point 
calibration screen.  Participants were informed about the eye tracking system at the 
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beginning of the experiment and were asked to remain as still as possible while the 
experiment was in progress, to try not to look away from the computer screen at any time, 
and to refrain from looking down at their hand when making button press responses.   
Finally, after the post-test was completed, all of the participants were asked to fill out 
a questionnaire.  The first question was open-ended and asked participants to describe, in 
their own words, what their goal during the experiment was.  This was to allow us to see 
if participants in the simulator group understood the instructions to simulate malingering.  
Following this open-ended question were three questions that required ratings on a 6-
point Likert scale (0 = none of the attribute, 5 = a great deal).  These three questions 
asked about the participants’ effort, motivation, and confidence, respectively, about 
completing the previously described goal for the experiment.  The simulator group had 
one additional question about strategies that were used to accomplish the goal and were 
provided with several options (e.g. answered in a pattern; answered a certain percentage 
of questions incorrectly; looked purposefully away from task-relevant materials); they 
were encouraged to report all of the strategies that they used during the experiment in an 
effort to comply with task instructions.  There was also a space for them to indicate any 
strategies they used that were not in the list of available strategies.  The full post-test 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.   Following the post-test questionnaire, all 
participants were fully debriefed.   
Counterbalancing 
Scenes and faces were randomly assigned to lists, which rotated across experimental 
conditions. Faces and scenes from respective lists were paired randomly for each 
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participant, and the order in which pairs were presented during each study block was 
randomized.  
Individual participants assigned to each group were yoked – the test displays seen by 
yoked participants were identical, but because of differences in encoding history, the 
same display was target-present (i.e. contained the studied associate) for one participant 
and target-absent (i.e. did not contain the studied associate) for the other. 
Use of this yoking procedure meant that a single critical face could be designated for all 
of the test trials. This critical face was the associate (i.e. the face that had been paired 
with the scene cue) in target-present displays and was the same face, absent the studied 
association, for yoked target-absent displays (see Figure 1). Individual participants 
assigned to the simulator and control groups were also yoked, which meant that 
corresponding simulators and controls saw the same scene-face pairs in the same order 
during encoding, and the same 3-face displays assigned to the same experimental 
conditions and presented in the same order during test. Counterbalancing ensured that 
across test trials, the critical face appeared equally often in each of the three locations for 
each experimental condition (i.e. target-present, target-absent).  
Data Analysis 
Procedures used to evaluate direct (behavioral) measures of memory and indirect 
(eye-movement-based) indices of memory are described in the sections that follow. 
Behavioral Measures.  In order to evaluate the accuracy of each participant’s 
present/absent responses, corrected recognition and discriminability (d’) measures were 
calculated. Here corrected recognition was defined as the proportion of hits minus the 
proportion of false alarms, which has a value of 0 for chance performance. In this study, 
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hits correspond to target-present trials identified as containing the associate, while false 
alarms correspond to target-absent trials identified as containing the associate.  The 
proportion of hits was determined by dividing the number of hits by the total number of 
hits and misses and the proportion of false alarms was calculated by dividing the number 
of false alarms by the total number of false alarms and correct rejections. Group-level 
corrected recognition and d’ scores were compared to each other using an independent 
samples t-test and to chance performance (0 for both measures) using a one-sample t-test. 
Response times were also compared for each trial type (i.e. target-present and target-
absent) using a repeated-measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor. 
Eye movement behavior.  Evidence for memory retrieval in eye movement behavior 
was taken from two classes of eye movement measures: 1) a global viewing time 
measure, and 2) a time-course measure. In both cases, eye movements to a specific 
critical face embedded in each 3-face test display were evaluated. The critical face was 
the face that had been studied with the scene cue for target-present displays, and was the 
yoked comparison face for target-absent displays (see Figure 1).   
Global Viewing Time Analysis: The proportion of total viewing time directed to 
critical faces was calculated for every trial. Resulting viewing time data were then binned 
as a function of experimental condition (target-present trials, target-absent trials). 
Simulator data from target-present trials were further subdivided based on recognition 
accuracy (i.e. target-present hits, target-present misses), a split that was not performed on 
control group data because these participants made very few errors (mean=3.28, 
sd=3.20). Because critical faces embedded in target-absent displays were 
indistinguishable from foil faces (none of the faces had been studied with the scene cue 
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during encoding), data from these trials were collapsed irrespective of recognition 
accuracy for both groups. Direct comparisons confirmed that this was appropriate, as 
there were no differences in the proportion of viewing time directed to critical faces 
embedded in target-absent displays as a function of accuracy for simulators (correct: 
M=.33, sd=.10, incorrect: M =.35, sd=.08; t(17)=-.48, p=.64). Controls made very few 
errors, which meant that this comparison could not be performed.  
Memory-based viewing time comparisons were performed by calculating 
difference scores for each participant (i.e. viewing directed to critical faces from target-
present displays minus viewing directed to critical faces from target-absent displays). 
Positive scores indicate that memory-based viewing is present, and the magnitude of this 
difference score indicates how robust these viewing time differences are. An independent 
samples t-test was used to compare the magnitude of memory-based viewing across 
groups, while a paired t-test was used to compare the viewing effect across accuracy 
within the simulator group. 
Time-Course Analysis: Because past work has indicated that eye-movement-based 
memory effects are statistically reliable shortly after display onset (Hannula et al., 2007; 
Hannula & Ranganath, 2009), evaluation of eye movement data collapsed across the 
entire test trial may not be especially informative in this study. Therefore, after having 
evaluated group differences in proportion of total viewing time, as described above, the 
data were separated into consecutive 250ms time bins starting with the onset of each 3-
face test display. It was predicted that the magnitude of the eye-movement-based memory 
effect would be well-matched across groups early in viewing (e.g., within the first 500-
750ms of 3-face display onset), but that group differences would emerge thereafter. To 
29	  	  
	  	  
evaluate this prediction, difference scores (i.e. proportion of total viewing time directed 
to critical faces from target-present displays minus proportion of total viewing time 
directed to critical faces from target-absent displays) were calculated for each participant 
for each of the first four 250ms time points following stimulus onset. As above, positive 
values indicate that more time was spent viewing critical faces from target-present than 
target-absent displays, and index memory for studied scene-face relationships (i.e. the 
magnitude of the eye-movement-based memory effect). For controls, these difference 
scores were calculated using correct target-present trials; for simulators, the same scores 
were calculated separately using correct and incorrect target-present trials. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor was used to compare viewing 
effects across time between controls and simulators was computed. In addition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA with accuracy as a within-subjects factor was used to 
compare viewing effects across time between correct and incorrect trials within the 
simulator group. 
Participants were removed from all analyses if their data did not contain at least 4 
trials that were considered “well-tracked” (trial time exceeding 65% of the duration of the 
three-face display) for each of the trial types that were analyzed (correct target-present 
trials and combined target-absent trials for controls; correct and incorrect target-present 
trials and combined target-absent trials for simulators). This resulted in the removal of 10 
participants because reliable tracking data was not obtained, referred to in the Participants 
section above.  
Post-test analyses.  Similar analyses that were conducted on the test blocks in terms 
of accuracy and response time measures were conducted with the data from the post-test.  
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Data acquired using the post-test questionnaire were evaluated to ensure that participants 
understood the instructions, to assess their effort and motivation levels, and to investigate 
the types of strategies they used to complete the simulated malingering task.  
Results 
Recognition Accuracy 
 It was predicted that participants assigned to the control group would successfully 
distinguished target-present from target-absent displays and outperform participants from 
the simulator group.  This prediction was confirmed when the groups’ corrected 
recognition scores were compared (t(34)=11.82, p<.001, Cohen’s d=3.94; see Table 1).  
This outcome remained the same when group comparisons were performed using d’ as a 
measure of accuracy (t(34)=10.68, p<.001, Cohen’s d=3.57; see Table 1).  Furthermore, 
while control group performance was reliably greater than chance (t’s(17)≥12.00, 
p’s≤.001), the same could not be said for simulators (t’s(17)≤ -.40, p’s≥.68 for corrected 
recognition and d’, respectively); collectively, these outcome confirm our behavioral 
accuracy predictions.  
Table 1 





 Because it was expected that completing the memory task while attempting to 
conceal knowledge of scene-face pairs would be more cognitively demanding than 
simply completing the task optimally, it was predicted that simulators would make slower 
	   Corrected	  Recognition	  (%)	   d’	  Controls	   81.17(18.87)	   3.09	  (1.09)	  Simulators	   2.16(23.19)	   0.06(0.61)	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present/absent responses than controls. To test this prediction, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the factors Group (Control, Simulator) and Trial Type (target-present, 
target-absent) was calculated.  This ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Group 
(F(1,34)=8.964, p=.005), where control participants were faster overall than simulator 
participants.   Target-present trials were also responded to more quickly than target-
absent trials (F(1,34)=16.85, p<.001), however, the Trial Type by Group interaction was 
not significant (F(1,34)=.495, p=.487). In sum, control participants responded faster than 
simulators on both target-present (controls: M=2170.28, sd=462.36, simulators: 
M=2735.49, sd=662.28) and target-absent trials (controls: M=2406.15, sd=482.40; 
simulators: M=2902.40, sd=576.97).  As above, this pattern of results confirms the 
predicted outcome. 
Eye-Movement-Based Memory Effect 
 Global Viewing Time Analysis: Due to the robust line of research using this 
paradigm, it was expected that over the 6 seconds that the three-face display was 
presented, control participants would show disproportionate viewing towards matching 
critical faces.  Because of the instructional manipulation used in the current study, it was 
anticipated that the magnitude of this viewing effect would be reduced for simulator 
participants, particularly on trials for which incorrect responses were made.  Therefore, 
our first analyses compared the overall magnitude of disproportionate viewing, collapsed 
across the entire six second test trial. Here we first conducted an independent samples t-
test comparing the difference scores for control and simulator participants, limited to 
correctly classified target-present trials.  It showed that the magnitude of disproportionate 
viewing for control participants was reliably greater than for simulator participants, 
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(t(34)=2.83, p=.008; see Figure 
2A). This supports the above 
prediction.  We followed up by 
conducting a one-sample t-test to 
compare each group’s magnitude 
of disproportionate viewing to 0, 
which would represent no greater 
viewing of matching critical faces 
than critical face from target-
absent displays.  Greater than 
chance viewing of the matching 
critical face was evident for both 
groups of participants when 
target-present trials were correctly 
identified (t’s(17) ≥4.28, 
p’s≤.001; see Figure 2A.)    
We also conducted a 
paired samples t-test comparing 
the magnitude of disproportionate 
viewing of simulator participants 
for correctly and incorrectly 
recognized target-present trials, as 
we had predicted that an even 
Figure	  2.	  Eye	  movement	  based	  memory	  effect	  data.	  A)	  Overall	  magnitude	  of	  disproportionate	  viewing	  towards	  matching	  critical	  faces.	  B)	  Time	  course	  of	  proportion	  of	  viewing	  time	  directed	  towards	  critical	  faces.	  C)	  Magnitude	  of	  disproportionate	  viewing	  for	  first	  1000ms.	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greater reduction in viewing effects would be evident on incorrect trials due to 
participants’ attempts to hide their memory.  This t-test showed that the magnitude of 
disproportionate viewing for correctly recognized trials was reliably greater than for 
incorrectly recognized trials (t(17)=3.09, p=.007; see Figure 2A).  Again this supports our 
hypothesis.  In addition, we compared the magnitude of disproportionate viewing for 
incorrectly classified trials to 0, and this time found that for these trials, simulators’ 
disproportionate viewing was not reliably above chance (t(17)=1.34, p=.20).  Therefore, 
when examining viewing across the whole trial for simulators, the presence of 
disproportionate viewing appears to coincide with explicit response accuracy. 
 Time-Course Analysis: Results reported above suggest that eye tracking may be 
insensitive to detecting concealed memories. However, previous studies have shown that 
eye-movement based relational memory effects occur very early in viewing.  Therefore, it 
was predicted that viewing measures may be more sensitive to concealed memories 
shortly after display onset.    To evaluate this prediction, a time course analysis was 
completed (see Figure 2B) and the first 1000ms after display onset was selected for 
analysis based on previous findings of the timing of eye-movement-based relational 
memory effects (Hannula et al., 2007). Then, a repeated measures ANOVA with group 
(simulator, control) as a between-subjects factor and time bin (0-250, 250-500, 500-750, 
and 750-1000) as a within-subjects factor was calculated using the magnitude scores that 
were calculated for each time bin (see Figure 2C).   Results indicated that the eye-
movement-based memory effect became more robust as the trial progressed 
(F(3,34)=29.75, p<.001) and that between groups differences emerged across time bins 
(significant time bin x group interaction: F(3,34)=2.87, p=.04). The main effect of group 
34	  	  
	  	  
was not statistically reliable (F(1,34)=2.14, p=.15).  Planned comparisons showed no 
significant differences between groups for the 0-250ms, 250-500ms, or 500-750ms time 
bins (all t’s(34)<.64, p’s>.05; See Figure 2C).  However, there was a reliable difference 
between groups for the 750-1000ms time bin (t(34)=3.47, p=.001), where the control 
participants showed a greater memory-based viewing effect than the simulators. Follow-
up analyses confirmed that the eye-movement-based memory effect was reliably greater 
than chance for both groups for the 250-500ms, 500-750ms, and 750-1000ms time bins 
(t’s(17)>2.05, p’s<.028); above-chance viewing was not evident from 0-250ms (t’s(17)<-
.64, p’s>.42).  These analyses show that very early in viewing (i.e. between 250-750ms) 
magnitude of disproportionate viewing is comparable between simulators and controls as 
we predicted, and that it is only later in viewing that group differences emerge.   
 Also focusing on the first 1000ms, we again conducted an analysis comparing 
trials of different accuracy within the simulator participants.  A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with accuracy (hits, misses) as a within-subjects factor was used to evaluate the 
prediction that magnitude of disproportionate viewing would be comparable between 
correct and incorrect target-present trials early in viewing.  Results indicated again that 
the magnitude of viewing increased across time bins (F(3,17)=9.62, p<.001), but did not 
differ as a function of accuracy (F(1,17)=.69, p=.42).  The interaction between time bin 
and accuracy was also not statistically reliable (F(3,17)=1.04, p=.38. Planned t-tests for 
each of the time bins were then conducted.  No reliable differences in magnitude of 
disproportionate viewing between correct and incorrect trials were found for the 0-
250ms, 250-500ms, or 500-750ms time bins (all t’s(17)<.29, p’s>.05; see Figure 2C).  
However, there was a reliable difference at the 750-1000ms time bin (t(17)=2.18, p=.04), 
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where memory-based viewing time differences were greater for correctly recognized 
target-present trials than incorrectly recognized trials.  We also compared the magnitude 
of disproportionate viewing for incorrect trials for each time bin to 0 and found no 
reliable disproportionate viewing for the 0-250ms time bin (t(17)=-.21, p=.83), and 
disproportionate viewing reliably greater than 0 for the 250-500ms, 500-750ms, and 750-
1000ms time bins (all t’s(17)>1.95, p’s<.03). Again, this more focused analysis of early 
disproportionate viewing supports our hypothesis that simulators show comparable 
disproportionate viewing towards matching critical faces even when they incorrectly 
classify these match trials.    
Post-test Analyses 
 On the post-test, all of the participants were instructed to complete the task 
optimally.  Consistent with our predictions, despite this equivalency of instructions, 
corrected recognition on the present/absent response was greater for controls than 
simulators (t(34)=2.12, p=.04, Cohen’s d=.71; see Table 2).  However, when d’ was used 
as a measure of accuracy, this between groups difference was marginal (t(34)=1.27, 
p=.22, Cohen’s d=.10).  Accuracy was also assessed by calculating the percentage of 
target-present trials where participants correctly selected the matching face from the 
three-face display.  Consistent with the corrected recognition outcome above, controls 
identified the associate more often than simulators although this difference fell just short 
of the cutoff for statistical reliability (t(34)=2.00, p=.053, Cohen’s d=.67).  Closer 
evaluation of the data indicated that this outcome may have been influenced by one 
control participant who performed more than two standard deviations below the group 
mean on this post-test measure.  When data from this participant were removed, there 
36	  	  
	  	  
was a reliable between-groups difference on this measure (t(33)=3.07, p=.005, Cohen’s 
d=1.02).  These results appear to indicate that, as predicted, the simulator participants are 
less successful at retrieving the face-scene pairs during the post-test even though they are 
now instructed to perform at their best.   
Table 2 
Correct Recognition, d’, and Forced-Choice Accuracy Means and Standard Deviations 
of Post-Test 
 
Time required to select the matching face or a random face in the absence of a 
match during the post-test was also examined.  A repeated measures ANOVA with group 
as a between subjects variable (control, simulator) and trial type as a within subjects 
variable (target-present, target-absent) was conducted.  Here we found a significant main 
effect of trial type (F(1,34)= 61.71, p<.001), where target-present trials were responded to 
more quickly (M=2632.77, sd=615.06)  than target-absent trials (M=2193.59, 
sd=613.94).  There were no differences in response times between groups (F(1,34)=.95, 
p=.34), nor was there a significant interaction between group and trial type (F(1,34)=.05, 
p=.83).  Due to presence/absence judgments being made verbally, response times for 
these judgments could not be analyzed.   
 The post-test questionnaire confirmed that participants understood the instructions 
that were given to them.  Effort, motivation, and confidence levels were high for both 
groups (controls: Effort – M=4.56, sd=.62, Motivation – M=4.27, sd=.75, Confidence – 
	   Corrected	  Recognition	  (%)	   d’	   Forced	  Choice	  Accuracy	  (%)	  Controls	   74.79	  (26.14)	   2.04	  (2.04)	   91.30	  (13.24)	  Simulators	   56.17	  (26.19)	   1.87	  (1.13)	   82.76	  (12.37)	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M=4.00, sd=1.03; simulators: Effort – M=4.22, sd=.65, Motivation – M=4.11, sd=.83, 
Confidence – M=3.83, sd=.71). The most common strategies that simulator participants 
reported using to complete the malingering task were answering randomly (n=11), 
looking away from task relevant materials (n=9), and taking longer than necessary to 
respond to trials (n=8). 
Discussion	  The	  above	  results	  suggest	  that,	  as	  hypothesized,	  eye	  movement	  based	  measures	  are	  sensitive	  to	  relational	  memory	  even	  when	  a	  person	  is	  attempting	  to	  conceal	  their	  knowledge.	  	  Explicit	  behavioral	  responses	  showed	  that	  participants	  instructed	  to	  feign	  memory	  impairment	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  with	  their	  explicit	  responses,	  performing	  much	  worse	  than	  control	  participants	  and	  no	  different	  from	  chance	  level	  performance.	  	  However,	  despite	  this	  success	  concealing	  their	  memory	  through	  their	  explicit	  responses,	  early	  disproportionate	  viewing	  towards	  matching	  associates	  provided	  evidence	  for	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  This	  viewing	  pattern	  was	  observed	  not	  only	  for	  trials	  in	  which	  the	  participants	  correctly	  stated	  that	  the	  matching	  face	  was	  present,	  but	  also	  for	  those	  in	  which	  the	  participant	  concealed	  their	  memory	  by	  denying	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  associate.	  It	  is	  also	  notable	  that	  for	  this	  early	  disproportionate	  viewing,	  the	  magnitude	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  groups	  for	  correctly	  answered	  trials	  or	  within	  simulators	  between	  correctly	  and	  incorrectly	  answered	  trials.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  this	  effect	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  instructions	  to	  conceal	  memory	  generally,	  or	  by	  the	  decision	  to	  conceal	  memory	  on	  a	  particular	  trial.	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First,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  not	  observable	  when	  the	  entire	  duration	  of	  the	  display	  is	  considered.	  	  When	  the	  whole	  six	  seconds	  were	  analyzed,	  simulator	  participants	  only	  showed	  disproportionate	  viewing	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  answered	  correctly,	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  disproportionate	  viewing	  for	  these	  trials	  was	  reduced	  compared	  to	  control	  subjects.	  	  It	  was	  only	  when	  analyses	  were	  restricted	  to	  the	  first	  1000ms	  of	  viewing	  that	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  eye	  movement	  measures	  were	  evident.	  	  This	  outcome	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  conducting	  time	  course	  analyses,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  we	  used	  in	  this	  study,	  when	  analyzing	  eye	  movement	  measures.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  effect	  occurs	  so	  quickly	  after	  stimulus	  onset	  replicates	  previous	  findings	  (Hannula	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Hannula	  &	  Ranganath,	  2009),	  and	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  proposal	  that	  this	  eye-­‐movement-­‐based	  memory	  effect	  is	  an	  obligatory	  reaction	  to	  the	  retrieval	  of	  a	  relational	  memory.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  viewing	  decreases	  after	  this	  initial	  effect	  back	  to	  chance	  levels	  when	  simulators	  make	  incorrect	  trials	  further	  supports	  this	  idea,	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  when	  participants	  can	  consciously	  control	  their	  viewing,	  they	  attempt	  to	  look	  away	  from	  the	  matching	  face	  in	  accord	  with	  their	  goal	  of	  concealing	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  scene-­‐face	  pair.	  	  	  Again,	  this	  implies	  that	  the	  early	  viewing	  effect	  may	  be	  a	  non-­‐conscious	  effect	  of	  memory,	  occurring	  before	  task-­‐relevant	  influences,	  such	  as	  goals,	  begin	  to	  impact	  viewing	  (see	  also	  Hannula	  &	  Ranganath,	  2009).	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  pattern	  of	  viewing	  that	  we	  observed	  in	  our	  simulator	  participants	  differs	  from	  previously	  described	  viewing	  patterns	  of	  patients	  with	  documented	  relational	  memory	  deficits	  (Hannula	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Williams	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  When	  tested	  with	  a	  similar	  paradigm,	  these	  patients	  showed	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similar	  decreased	  behavioral	  performance	  as	  our	  simulator	  participants.	  	  However,	  these	  patients	  showed	  viewing	  patterns	  that	  differed	  from	  those	  of	  controls	  and	  from	  our	  simulators.	  	  Patients	  with	  hippocampal	  amnesia	  did	  not	  show	  any	  disproportionate	  viewing	  to	  matching	  faces	  on	  either	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly	  answered	  trials,	  even	  when	  analyses	  were	  restricted	  to	  early	  viewing	  (Hannula	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  Patients	  with	  schizophrenia	  who	  have	  documented	  relational	  memory	  deficits	  showed	  some	  disproportionate	  viewing,	  but	  it	  was	  of	  decreased	  magnitude	  and	  occurred	  later	  in	  time	  than	  control	  patterns	  of	  viewing	  (Williams	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  These	  differences	  in	  viewing	  patterns	  between	  our	  simulator	  group	  and	  these	  groups	  of	  patients	  indicate	  that	  eye	  movement	  measures	  evaluated	  early	  in	  viewing	  could	  be	  useful	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  people	  who	  truly	  have	  memory	  impairment	  and	  those	  who	  are	  malingering	  this	  type	  of	  deficit.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  developing	  measures	  that	  can	  differentiate	  between	  these	  two	  groups	  is	  an	  important	  endeavor	  because	  malingering	  is	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  societal	  resources	  and	  because	  current	  methods	  have	  significant	  flaws.	  	  Obviously,	  much	  more	  work	  would	  need	  to	  be	  conducted	  before	  eye	  movement	  measures	  could	  be	  proposed	  as	  a	  method	  for	  clinically	  determining	  a	  person’s	  level	  of	  effort.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  studies	  would	  be	  needed	  in	  which	  both	  patients	  and	  simulators	  are	  tested	  on	  the	  same	  protocol,	  which	  would	  allow	  for	  calculations	  of	  important	  indicators	  of	  how	  useful	  eye	  movement	  measures	  might	  be,	  such	  as	  sensitivity	  and	  specificity.	  	  	  As	  just	  mentioned,	  current	  methods	  of	  detecting	  malingering	  are	  subject	  to	  criticism	  and	  have	  some	  flaws.	  	  One	  of	  the	  biggest	  criticisms	  of	  neuropsychological	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performance	  validity	  testing	  is	  that	  coaching	  of	  what	  these	  measures	  look	  like	  can	  undermine	  their	  success	  in	  detecting	  malingering.	  	  When	  a	  person	  who	  is	  attempting	  to	  malinger	  is	  aware	  of	  which	  tests	  in	  the	  neuropsychological	  battery	  are	  intended	  to	  measure	  effort,	  they	  can	  change	  their	  strategy	  selectively	  for	  these	  measures	  and	  circumvent	  being	  detected	  by	  these	  tests.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  a	  theoretical	  concern.	  	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  lawyers,	  about	  50%	  of	  attorneys	  stated	  that	  they	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  part	  of	  their	  responsibility	  as	  a	  lawyer	  to	  inform	  their	  clients	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  performance	  validity	  tests	  in	  neuropsychological	  batteries	  (Wetter	  &	  Corrigan,	  1995).	  	  A	  later	  study	  showed	  that	  around	  75%	  of	  attorneys	  spend	  time	  preparing	  clients	  for	  neuropsychological	  examinations	  including	  providing	  descriptions	  of	  the	  types	  of	  assessments	  that	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  used	  and	  describing	  the	  ways	  that	  assessors	  test	  for	  malingering	  (Essig	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  With	  test	  security	  threatened	  because	  of	  the	  widespread	  availability	  of	  information	  on	  these	  tests	  online	  (Bauer	  &	  McCaffrey,	  2006),	  it	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  for	  a	  person	  undergoing	  a	  forensic	  evaluation	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  exactly	  which	  measures	  were	  being	  used	  to	  detect	  malingering.	  	  Furthermore,	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  coached	  malingerers	  may	  show	  more	  sophisticated	  techniques	  for	  feigning	  their	  impairments	  (Youngjohn,	  Lees-­‐Haley,	  &	  Binder,	  1999).	  	  Eye	  movement	  measures	  are	  not	  necessarily	  immune	  to	  these	  coaching	  concerns.	  	  Our	  study	  did	  not	  test	  how	  viewing	  patterns	  of	  simulators	  would	  change	  if	  they	  were	  informed	  ahead	  of	  time	  that	  their	  eye	  movements	  could	  reveal	  their	  knowledge	  for	  the	  pairs.	  	  This	  is	  a	  study	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  conducted.	  	  However,	  we	  would	  predict	  that	  even	  with	  this	  coaching,	  the	  pattern	  of	  early	  disproportionate	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viewing	  to	  matching	  faces	  would	  remain	  the	  same.	  	  Again,	  this	  is	  because	  we	  believe	  that	  these	  eye-­‐movement-­‐based	  memory	  effects	  represent	  an	  obligatory	  reaction	  to	  the	  retrieval	  of	  the	  matching	  face	  given	  the	  scene	  cue,	  and	  therefore	  the	  simulator	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  prevent	  it	  from	  occurring.	  	  Instead,	  we	  might	  predict	  an	  even	  greater	  decrease	  in	  viewing	  of	  the	  matching	  face	  after	  this	  initial	  effect,	  once	  consciously	  controlled	  eye	  movements	  come	  online	  and	  the	  participant	  attempts	  to	  disengage	  attention	  to	  prevent	  detection.	  	  This	  disengagement	  of	  attention	  from	  the	  matching	  face,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  decrease	  in	  viewing	  directed	  towards	  it	  after	  the	  initial	  effect,	  is	  also	  of	  interest.	  	  It	  occurs	  to	  some	  degree	  for	  correctly	  answered	  trials,	  as	  the	  viewing	  on	  these	  trials	  was	  lower	  than	  for	  control	  participants.	  It	  is	  most	  noticeable,	  however,	  in	  the	  incorrectly	  answered	  trials,	  in	  which	  the	  viewing	  of	  the	  matching	  face	  reduces	  to	  the	  level	  of	  viewing	  of	  non-­‐matching	  critical	  faces	  in	  target-­‐absent	  displays.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  when	  simulators	  have	  decided	  to	  conceal	  their	  memory	  by	  responding	  incorrectly,	  they	  do	  have	  some	  inclination	  to	  divert	  their	  attention,	  and	  their	  eye	  movements,	  away	  from	  the	  matching	  face.	  	  This	  idea	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  self-­‐reported	  strategy	  employed	  by	  half	  of	  simulator	  participants	  to	  intentionally	  look	  away	  from	  task-­‐relevant	  materials.	  	  While	  they	  were	  obviously	  aware	  that	  their	  eye	  movements	  were	  being	  monitored,	  they	  were	  not	  instructed	  as	  to	  how	  they	  should	  view	  the	  display	  or	  told	  about	  our	  expectation	  for	  eye	  movements	  to	  reveal	  their	  memory.	  	  This	  provides	  further	  evidence	  that	  the	  initial	  memory-­‐based	  effect	  might	  represent	  an	  obligatory	  reaction,	  as	  participants	  seemed	  to	  understand	  that	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not	  viewing	  the	  matching	  face	  was	  important	  for	  success	  in	  their	  goal	  of	  simulating	  malingered	  amnesia.	  	  	  We	  also	  examined	  performance	  on	  a	  posttest	  in	  which	  the	  instructions	  to	  simulate	  malingering	  were	  removed	  for	  the	  simulator	  group.	  	  Despite	  simulator	  and	  control	  participants	  completing	  the	  same	  task	  under	  the	  same	  instructions	  to	  optimize	  performance	  during	  this	  part	  of	  the	  experiment,	  the	  control	  participants’	  accuracy	  in	  both	  identifying	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  matching	  face	  and	  selecting	  the	  matching	  face	  from	  the	  three	  alternatives	  in	  the	  display	  exceeded	  that	  of	  the	  simulator	  participants.	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  that	  this	  might	  have	  occurred.	  	  First,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  simulator	  participants,	  knowing	  that	  they	  were	  going	  to	  have	  to	  fake	  a	  memory	  impairment,	  chose	  not	  to	  study	  the	  materials	  as	  well	  as	  controls	  during	  the	  encoding	  phase.	  	  This	  could	  be	  a	  good	  strategy,	  as	  participants	  were	  not	  warned	  about	  the	  need	  to	  accurately	  recall	  the	  pairs	  on	  the	  posttest	  during	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  plausible.	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  eye-­‐movement	  based	  memory	  effects	  early	  in	  viewing	  were	  as	  robust	  in	  simulator	  participants	  as	  in	  control	  participants.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  encoding	  of	  the	  scene-­‐face	  pair	  was	  comparable	  between	  groups.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  could	  also	  be	  tested	  by	  informing	  the	  simulator	  participants	  of	  the	  posttest	  before	  the	  encoding	  phase,	  so	  that	  they	  would	  be	  more	  motivated	  to	  encode	  the	  materials.	  	  This	  is	  something	  that	  we	  are	  implementing	  in	  upcoming	  studies.	  	  	  A	  second	  explanation	  for	  the	  impairment	  on	  the	  posttest	  is	  that	  the	  control	  participants	  had	  an	  extra	  opportunity	  to	  retrieve	  and	  strengthen	  the	  memory	  during	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the	  test	  phase,	  and	  that	  the	  simulator	  participants	  missed	  this	  opportunity	  due	  to	  their	  attempts	  to	  conceal	  memory.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  the	  act	  of	  malingering	  harms	  the	  memory	  trace	  of	  simulators,	  but	  rather	  the	  act	  of	  not	  malingering	  allows	  controls	  to	  strengthen	  their	  memory	  for	  the	  scene-­‐face	  pairs.	  	  However,	  this	  explanation	  also	  has	  some	  problems.	  	  Again,	  the	  simulator	  participants	  did	  seem	  to	  have	  some	  memory	  retrieval	  during	  the	  test	  phase,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  eye	  movement	  based	  memory	  effect.	  	  In	  addition,	  control	  participants’	  performance	  did	  not	  improve	  from	  the	  initial	  test	  to	  the	  posttest,	  so	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  testing	  effect	  is	  improving	  their	  performance	  and	  driving	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  	  	  One	  last	  explanation	  for	  decreased	  posttest	  performance	  among	  simulators,	  and	  the	  one	  that	  seems	  most	  plausible,	  is	  that	  the	  act	  of	  concealing	  memory	  during	  the	  initial	  test	  somehow	  harms	  subsequent	  retrieval	  of	  the	  studied	  pairs.	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  attempts	  to	  suppress	  memory	  retrieval	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  cue	  decreases	  the	  ability	  to	  retrieve	  that	  memory	  at	  a	  later	  time,	  a	  phenomenon	  termed	  suppression-­‐induced	  forgetting	  (Anderson	  &	  Green,	  2001).	  	  If	  the	  simulator	  participants	  were	  attempting	  to	  suppress	  memory	  for	  the	  face	  when	  presented	  with	  the	  scene	  cue	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  their	  goal,	  this	  suppression-­‐induced	  forgetting	  could	  account	  for	  the	  relatively	  weaker	  performance	  on	  the	  posttest	  by	  these	  participants.	  	  The	  current	  study	  is	  not	  without	  its	  limitations.	  	  First,	  the	  fact	  that	  control	  participants	  had	  very	  few	  incorrect	  trials	  is	  both	  a	  strength	  and	  a	  weakness.	  	  Their	  near-­‐ceiling	  performance	  is	  a	  strength	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  reasonably	  conclude	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that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  incorrect	  responses	  given	  by	  the	  simulator	  participants	  were	  due	  to	  their	  attempts	  to	  conceal	  their	  memory	  rather	  than	  simply	  not	  remembering	  the	  face	  that	  had	  been	  paired	  with	  the	  scene.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  incorrect	  trials	  to	  analyze	  for	  the	  control	  participants	  is	  a	  weakness	  in	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  compare	  viewing	  patterns	  on	  incorrect	  trials	  across	  groups	  as	  we	  did	  for	  the	  correct	  trials.	  	  Finding	  a	  way	  to	  implement	  this	  paradigm	  while	  increasing	  the	  difficulty	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  examine	  the	  pattern	  of	  viewing	  of	  participants	  who	  are	  attempting	  to	  optimize	  performance	  but	  who	  miss	  a	  matching	  face	  in	  a	  target-­‐present	  display	  and	  compare	  this	  pattern	  to	  that	  of	  our	  simulators.	  	  Another	  limitation	  of	  our	  study	  is	  that,	  although	  we	  are	  attempting	  to	  study	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  malingering,	  our	  sample	  consists	  of	  college	  students	  instructed	  to	  simulate	  malingering.	  	  There	  are	  many	  differences	  between	  this	  group	  and	  true	  malingerers,	  the	  most	  important	  being	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  act.	  	  Our	  simulators	  were	  performing	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  experimenter,	  while	  a	  person	  malingering	  in	  the	  real	  world	  is	  often	  doing	  so	  for	  some	  kind	  of	  personal	  gain.	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  experience	  level	  of	  these	  two	  groups.	  	  By	  the	  time	  they	  make	  it	  to	  an	  evaluation,	  a	  true	  malingerer	  has	  likely	  had	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  practice	  acting	  out	  their	  memory	  deficit.	  	  Our	  participants	  were	  required	  to	  perform	  immediately	  after	  receiving	  the	  instructions	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  hide	  their	  memory.	  	  These	  differences	  could	  influence	  the	  strategies	  that	  these	  two	  groups	  use	  or	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  attempt	  to	  conceal	  their	  memory.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  gather	  a	  sample	  of	  people	  malingering	  in	  the	  real	  world	  as	  
45	  	  
	  	  
these	  people	  are	  usually	  not	  willing	  to	  admit	  to	  their	  actions,	  and	  so	  the	  simulation	  of	  malingering	  is	  likely	  the	  best	  approximation.	  	  We	  simply	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  our	  results	  might	  not	  be	  identical	  to	  what	  would	  be	  found	  in	  clinical	  or	  forensic	  settings.	  	  	  One	  next	  step	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  with	  this	  research	  is	  identifying	  which	  neural	  regions	  contribute	  to	  the	  memory,	  attention,	  and	  cognitive	  control	  processes	  that	  are	  required	  for	  successful	  completion	  of	  this	  simulated	  malingering	  task.	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  hippocampal	  activity	  during	  the	  scene	  cue	  predicts	  the	  disproportionate	  viewing	  directed	  towards	  the	  matching	  face	  during	  the	  three-­‐face	  display	  (Hannula	  &	  Ranganath,	  2009).	  	  This	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  pattern-­‐completion	  processes	  of	  the	  hippocampus,	  such	  that	  when	  participants	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  scene	  cue,	  the	  hippocampus	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  retrieval	  of	  the	  face	  that	  completes	  the	  pairing.	  	  This	  successful	  retrieval	  of	  the	  relational	  memory	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  what	  drives	  the	  early	  disproportionate	  viewing	  of	  the	  matching	  face.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  this	  hippocampal	  activity	  during	  the	  scene	  cue	  for	  both	  control	  and	  simulator	  participants	  on	  trials	  where	  they	  display	  disproportionate	  viewing.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  current	  study,	  this	  would	  include	  trials	  in	  which	  simulators	  hide	  their	  memory	  by	  explicitly	  responding	  incorrectly.	  	  	  While	  group	  differences	  in	  neural	  activity	  would	  not	  be	  expected	  during	  the	  scene	  cue,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  significant	  differences	  during	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  three-­‐face	  display.	  	  Response	  times	  in	  the	  current	  study,	  where	  simulator	  participants	  were	  slower	  to	  respond	  to	  both	  target-­‐present	  and	  target-­‐absent	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displays,	  may	  indicate	  that	  the	  act	  of	  simulating	  malingering	  is	  a	  more	  cognitively	  complex	  task	  than	  simply	  performing	  optimally.	  	  Successfully	  concealing	  memory	  would	  require	  cognitive	  control	  processes	  such	  as	  conflict	  monitoring	  and	  the	  disengagement	  of	  attention.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  would	  expect	  regions	  implicated	  in	  these	  processes,	  such	  as	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  and	  the	  lateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  along	  with	  other	  structures	  in	  the	  dorsal	  attention	  network	  (Anderson	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Kerns	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Corbetta	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  to	  be	  more	  active	  during	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  three-­‐face	  display	  in	  simulator	  participants	  than	  in	  controls.	  	  Finally,	  neuroimaging	  studies	  could	  be	  useful	  in	  investigating	  the	  question	  of	  the	  impaired	  posttest	  performance.	  As	  hippocampal	  activity	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  performance	  on	  relational	  memory	  tasks	  (Hannula	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  suppression	  of	  hippocampal	  activity	  during	  the	  three-­‐face	  display,	  when	  simulators	  are	  attempting	  to	  conceal	  successful	  retrieval,	  would	  be	  related	  to	  the	  decreased	  performance	  on	  the	  posttest.	  	  We	  would	  also	  expect	  that	  this	  suppression	  would	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  due	  to	  research	  that	  shows	  that	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  selective	  retrieval	  of	  memories	  that	  are	  appropriate	  for	  the	  current	  context	  and	  suppress	  those	  that	  are	  inappropriate	  (c.f.	  Preston	  &	  Eichenbaum,	  2013).	  	  This	  type	  of	  neuroimaging	  study	  is	  currently	  underway.	  	  	  	  	  In	  sum,	  this	  study	  added	  to	  a	  robust	  line	  of	  research	  that	  shows	  that	  eye-­‐movement	  measures	  are	  sensitive	  to	  relational	  memory	  and	  that	  these	  types	  of	  memory	  effects	  occur	  extremely	  rapidly	  after	  stimulus	  onset.	  	  The	  current	  study	  adds	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  eye	  movements	  might	  represent	  an	  obligatory	  response	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Instructions Read to the Simulator Group 
“For this experiment I would like you to imagine that you were in a car accident in which 
another driver hit your car. You were knocked unconscious, and woke up in the hospital. 
You were kept overnight for observation. The doctors told you that you experienced a 
concussion. Try to imagine that a year after the accident, you are involved in a lawsuit 
against the driver of the other car. If you are found to have experienced significant 
injuries as a result of the accident, you are likely to receive a bigger settlement. You have 
decided to pretend that you are suffering from a memory disorder as a result of the 
accident. As a part of the lawsuit, you are required to take a test to determine whether or 
not you actually have a memory problem. You will complete this test today.  If you can 
successfully convince the examiner that you have a memory deficit, you are likely to get 
a better settlement. However, it is important that you perform in a way so that the 
examiner believes that you truly have a memory problem, but that it is not obvious that 
you are faking.  For example, some strategies that would be too obvious, and would alert 
the examiner that you are faking, would be to answer every question incorrectly or to not 
answer some of the items.  Once the examiner enters the room, you won’t be able to ask 
any questions about these instructions, so, do you have any questions about what you are 






Post-Test Questionnaire 1)	  Recall,	  in	  your	  own	  words,	  what	  the	  instructed	  objective	  was	  for	  this	  experiment.	  2)	  How	  much	  effort	  did	  you	  put	  in	  to	  accomplish	  this	  objective?	  	  0	   	   1	   	   2	   	   3	   	   4	   	   5	  	  (No	  effort)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Great	  effort)	  	   3)	  How	  motivated	  were	  you	  to	  accomplish	  this	  objective?	  	  0	   	   1	   	   2	   	   3	   	   4	   	   5	  	  (Not	  motivated	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Very	  motivated)	  at	  all)	  	   4)	  How	  confident	  are	  you	  that	  you	  accomplished	  this	  objective?	  	  0	   	   1	   	   2	   	   3	   	   4	   	   5	  	  (Not	  confident	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Very	  confident)	  at	  all)	  	  5)	  What	  strategies	  did	  you	  use	  to	  accomplish	  the	  objective?	  (check	  all	  that	  apply)	  	  _______	  answered	  most/all	  items	  incorrectly	  	  _______	  answered	  in	  a	  pattern	  (e.g.	  alternated	  between	  “yes”	  and	  “no”)	  	  _______	  answered	  randomly	  	  _______	  looked	  purposely	  away	  from	  the	  task-­‐relevant	  materials	  (e.g.,	  looked	  at	  scenes,	  but	  not	  at	  faces)	  	  _______	  blurred	  vision	  so	  could	  not	  see	  stimulus	  during	  study	  or	  test	  phase	  	  _______	  attempted	  to	  get	  a	  certain	  percentage	  correct	  (what	  percentage?	  _________)	  	  	  _______	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  some/all	  test	  items	  	  _______	  took	  longer	  than	  was	  necessary	  to	  respond	  to	  test	  items	  	  _______	  other	  (please	  describe):	  ____________________________________________________________	  A	  
